

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

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SAM-01 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 ACDA-19 IO-14 OIC-04

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INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL USNATO 1116

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: PARA 29 MEASURES

REF: STATE 39727

CANADIAN DELEGATION HAS CIRCULATED COMMENTS ON PARA 29 MEASURES.

ACTION REQUESTED: THAT WASHINGTON INCORPORATE COMMENTS ON

CANADIAN PAPER IN ITS GUIDANCE CURRENTLY UNDER PREPARATION ON

THESE MEASURES (REFTEL). FULL TEXT OF CANADIAN PAPER FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

MEASURE I OF PARAGRAPH 29 CONCERNING LIMITATION ON FORCES
WHICH CAN MORE INTO THE NGA IN A POST REDUCTION SITUATION CAN PERHAPS
BEST BE DEALT WITH BY CONSIDERING THE LIMITS WHICH MUST BE PLACED ON
FORCES ENTERING FOR (1) NORMAL ROTATION PURPOSES AND (2)
EXERCISE PURPOSES.

LIMITS ON FORCES ENTERING FOR ROTATION

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WE SEE A NEED FOR AN EXAMINATION OF PRESENT FORCE ROTATION
PRACTICES OF USA AND USSR FORCES IN THE NGA. THIS STUDY SHOULD
AMONG OTHER THINGS ADDRESS ITSELF TO PROBLEMS WHICH WILL PERHAPS
NECESSITATE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF FORCES FOR EACH SIDE BEING

PERMITTED TO ENTER THE NGA FOR ROTATIONAL PURPOSES IN THE POST-MBFR SITUATION. THE STUDY WILL ALSO HAVE TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRESENT ROTATION SCHEDULES INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT OVERLAP BETWEEN FORCES ARRIVING IN THE NGA AND THOSE SCHEDULED TO DEPART; SUCH AN OVERLAP COULD SIGNIFICANTLY BOOST ON A TEMPORARY BASIS THE OVERALL NUMBER OF FORCES ON EACH SIDE IN THE NGA. IN ANY EVENT, THE AGREEMENT WILL HAVE TO BE TAILORED TO EXISTING ROTATION PATTERNS AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THESE PATTERNS APPEARS NECESSARY.

LIMITATIONS ON FORCES ENTERING NGA FOR EXERCISES

MEASURE III OF C-M(74)8 WOULD ALLOW FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS EXERCISING OF 50,000 TROOPS WITHIN TRAINING AREAS AND 50,000 OUTSIDE OF TRAINING AREAS. CLEARLY, ENTRY OF SUCH NUMBERS FROM OUTSIDE THE NGA WOULD NEGATE THE PURPOSE OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT AS ENTRY ON SUCH A SCALE WOULD IN FACT EXCEED REDUCTIONS BY EITHER SIDE. IT STRIKES US THAT ENTRY OF SOVIET FORCES FOR PURPOSES OF EXERCISES SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE LOWEST LEVELS COMPATIBLE WITH NATO REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTRY OF USA FORCES. WE NOTE EXISTING CONSTRAINTS STUDIES (AC/276-WP(72)27 AND D(72)4) SUGGEST RE-ENTRY OF OVER 11 BRIGADES BE PROHIBITED. WE FIND THIS FIGURE HIGH IN THAT IT IS BASED ON RE-ENTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH TRAINING PURPOSES AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS (RATHER THAN FOR PURELY TRAINING PURPOSES). PRESUMABLE IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION REQUIRING REINFORCEMENTS, SACEUR COULD ACT ACCORDING TO THE DEMANDS OF THE SITUATION. A FURTHER ARGUMENT FOR LIMITING THE RE-ENTRY OF FORCES TO LEVELS REQUIRED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY IS THAT IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION THE 60 DAY PRIOR NOTIFICATION PERIOD FOR A PRE-ANNOUNCED MAJOR EXERCISE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. ONE TASK WILL THEREFORE BE TO DETERMINE WITH SOME DEGREE OF ACCURACY USA TRAINING REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE NGA FOR USA FORCES PERMANENTLY STATIONED OUTSIDE NGA. EXISTING STUDIES INDICATE A USA TRAINING REQUIREMENT FOR HAVING TWO BRIGADES FREE TO ENTER NGA TEMPORARILY. (CONSTRAINTS STUDIES SUGGESTED A STAY OF UP TO 90 DAYS BE PERMITTED.)

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CONSIDERATION WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO THE QUESTION OF ENTRY OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT INTO THE NGA POST-MBFR FOR TRANSIT AND STAGING PURPOSES. DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, WE UNDERSTAND SOME USA FACILITIES IN THE NGA WERE USED AS A SUPPLY BRIDGE TO ISRAEL. (IT MAY BE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALREADY SOUGHT TO MEET THIS PROBLEM BY EXEMPTING HUNGARY FROM NGA; YOU WILL RECALL HUNGARY WAS USED AS STAGING AREA FOR SOVIET MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY EFFORT.)

END TEXT

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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